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Introduction
Legal education in Japan is in the midst of a radical
transformation. Until 2004, formal legal education in Japan had been the
province solely of undergraduate law programs.' Undergraduate law
classes are primarily large lecture courses that present rules of
substantive law and theories of interpretation of Japanese legal codes,
with little actual case analysis or class participation.2 Students who
actually want to become lawyers have generally regarded these classes as
distractions,3 and most of the graduates of these undergraduate programs
do not, and do not ever fully intend to, become lawyers.4 Instead, those
' See, e.g., Mark Thompson, Taking Law at Chijo: Japan's Approach to Legal
Education is Different. But is it Better?, in JAPANESE LAW IN CONTEXT:
READINGS IN SOCIETY, THE ECONOMY, AND POLITICS 41 (Curtis J. Milhaupt et
al. eds., 2001 ); Luke Nottage, Reformist Conservatism and Failures of
Imagination in Japanese Legal Education, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 16, 32
(2001).
2 Kohei Nakabo, Judicial Reform and the State of Japan's Attorney System. A
Discussion of Attorney Reform Issues and the Future of the Judiciary, 10 PAC.
RIM L. & POL'Y J. 623, 638 (2001) (Yohei Suda trans.) (2001). This is not to say
that Japanese undergraduate law students do not learn the law. See discussion
infra Part VI.C. Rather, in contrast to the case method used in American law
schools, the law is taught in the Japanese classroom as "an abstract body of legal
principles that are not closely tied to the actual cases in which those principles
are applied." James R. Maxeiner & Keiichi Yamanaka, The New Japanese Law
Schools: Putting the Professional into Legal Education, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y
J. 303, 309 (2004).
3 Most students quickly discover that law faculties offer only a
series of mass-produced, impersonal lectures with enrollments
that exceed 500 students. Students cannot pass the National
Bar Examination by attending these lectures. So students who
want to become lawyers go to preparatory cram schools and
do not bother attending university classes.
Yoshiharu Kawabata, The Reform of Legal Education and Training in Japan:
Problems and Prospects, 43 S. TEX. L. REv. 419, 432 (2002)
4 HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 101 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining that the most
popular career paths for graduates are either the civil service or business). The
law schools' own promotional materials state that graduates go on to
"participat[e] in key decision-making processes within our society" [University
of Tokyo materials] and "can truly contribute to society from any position,"
[Waseda University materials] implying that students may major in law and still
safely plan careers beyond the traditional legal professional categories of judge,
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who aspire to become lawyers, prosecutors, or judges, while majoring in
law as undergraduates, also devote years of study to national bar exam
preparation in specialized cram schools.5 Passing the extremely rigorous
national bar exam is the sole means of entry into a Legal Research and
Training Institute (LRTI) apprenticeship, which in turn is the sole gate-
way into the legal profession. 6 The bar passage rate has remained
extremely low for the past twenty years, averaging less than 3% of all
applicants! As a result, the ratio of citizens for each practicing attorney
in Japan in 2003 was 6,748 to 1,8 one of the lowest ratios in the
prosecutor, and private attorney (bengoshi). Yukio Yanagida, A New Paradigm
for Japanese Legal Training and Education-In Light of the Legal Education at
Harvard Law School, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 15 (2000).
5 The top universities, with the exception of the University of Tokyo, run their
own cram schools (yobiko, or "extracurricular schools") to help law students
who plan to take the bar examination. See Edward I. Chen, The National Law
Examination of Japan, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1989), reprinted in JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM 298 (Meryll Dean, 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter Dean]; see also
Setsuo Miyazawa, Education and Training of Lawyers in Japan-A Critical
Analysis, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 491, 493 (2002) ("While they are university law
students, their legal education actually takes place at cram school.").
6 Most successful applicants must try at least four times before they pass the
National Bar Examination. Kawabata, supra note 3, at 432. The LRTI is
controlled by the Supreme Court and the Japanese Bar, and fully funded by the
government. Eric A. Feldman, Mirroring Minds: Recruitment and Promotion
in Japan's Law Faculties, 41 AM. J. COMp. L. 465 (1993), reprinted in Dean,
supra note 5, at 301. The twenty-four month LRTI training program consists of
rotations between civil and criminal sections of district courts as well as offices
of private attorneys. Chen, supra note 5, at 299.
7 Over 30,000 law graduates take the bar exam each year, but only about 1,000
are allowed to pass the exam and enter the LRTI, making the LRTI "[t]he
bottleneck in the system." Gerald Paul McAlinn, Reforming the System of Legal
Education: A Callfor Bold Leadership and Self-Governance, 2 ASIAN PAC. L. &
POL'Y J. 15, 17-18 (2001); see also Kawabata, supra note 3, at 428 (finding that
the low bar passage rate "is responsible for the insufficient number of people in
the legal profession.").
8 The number of practicing attorneys in Japan in 2003 was 18,851. Japan
Federation of Bar Associations at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/
index.html (information as of April 1, 2004). The population of Japan is
approximately 127,214,499. The World Factbook at http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/ja.html (last updated February 10, 2005). See also
infra note 135 (regarding estimates of the number of "lawyers" in Japan).
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developed world.9 In April 2004, sixty-eight new graduate law schools
opened across Japan.' ° Rather than teaching test-taking tactics for the
bar exam, these schools will emphasize both academic training in legal
reasoning and professional training in practical legal skills, as is the
practice in American law schools. 1 In addition, the National Bar
Examination is being revised, and the number of successful bar
applicants is to increase to 3,000 per year by 2010.12
But why this sudden change in a country renowned for its
administrative bureaucracy and conservatism? Some fundamental
questions will naturally occur to anyone seeing these changes from the
outside: Why now? Why to this degree? And what sort of work are all
these new Japanese lawyers going to be doing?
9 The number of licensed attorneys in the United States in 2003 was 1,058,662.
American Bar Association at http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/
2002nbroflawyersbystate.pdf (on file with the University of Miami International
& Comparative Law Review). The population of the United States in 2003 was
approximately 290,342,554. The World Factbook at http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/us.html) (yielding a citizen/attorney ratio of 274/1)
(on file with the University of Miami International & Comparative Law
Review). The ratio of citizens to attorneys in France is 1476/1; in Germany,
708/1; in Sweden, 2323/1; in the United Kingdom, 384/1; in the Netherlands,
1324/1. See Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union at
http://www.ccbe.org/doc/statavocats.pdf (last updated January 2003); The
World Factbook at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.htm
(last updated January 1, 2004).
10 Ichiko Fuyuno, Japan Grooms New Lawyers, WALL ST. J., April 13, 2004, at
A18.
11 Eriko Arita, Sixty-Six Institutions Win Approval to Open U.S.-Style Law
Schools, THE JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, available at 2003 WL 8610293 at
*1. Two additional law schools were subsequently approved and allowed to
open in April 2004, bringing the total to 68. See Fuyuno, supra note 10.
12 Shihou seido kaikaku shingikai ikensho. nijuuisseiki no nihon wo sasaeru
shihou seido [Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council: For a
Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century], June 12, 2001, available
in English at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html
(last visited March 17, 2005) [hereinafter JSRC Report].
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While litigation rates in Japan may be on the rise, this comment
proposes that a great many of Japan's new lawyers will be called upon to
serve the needs of corporate Japan in roles beyond those of litigators.
Part II of this comment explains the broader context of the recent reforms
in Japanese legal education, including shifts in the economic, bureau-
cratic, and political landscape that are forcing Japan to rethink the role of
lawyers in Japanese society. Part III examines changes in litigation rates
in Japan, as well as administrative reforms related to litigation, all of
which may, at first glance, seem to account for the recent changes to the
Japanese legal education system. Part IV of this comment, however,
proposes roles that new Japanese lawyers will play that go beyond litiga-
tion, particularly advising and aiding corporate clients in their business
dealings, an area of law in which relatively few Japanese lawyers now
practice. Part V examines some of the major entities behind the calls for
reform. Part VI discusses the likely difficulties that legal education re-
form may present, as well as the effects that legal education reform will
have on the practice of law in Japan and on broader Japanese society.
I. Japan's Economic Travails and the Re-Shuffling of Power
A. Economic Recovery and the Response to Globalization
Japan has been in a serious economic slump for over ten years,
so it is perhaps natural to view current administrative reforms, including
judicial and legal education reforms, as elements of ongoing political
efforts to stimulate the beleaguered Japanese economy. Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi came to office in April 2001 promising to implement
the structural reforms needed to revitalize Japan's economy, including a
cleanup of bad bank loans, increased privatization and deregulation of
government services, and administrative reform of Japan's bureau-
cracy. 3 Part of these reforms includes making the Japanese legal system
larger, more transparent, and more responsive to the needs of Japanese
citizens and of foreign investors.'
4
The ongoing economic recession has exposed the vulnerability
of Japanese businesses to the most significant international business
phenomena of the past decade: increased global competition and
13A Dashing Disappointment: Japan's Stalled Reforms, THE ECONOMIST, July
13, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7246792 at *1.
14 Heather Smith, Wanted: More Lawyers, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Nov. 2003,
at 83.
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technological change. Japanese companies have initiated a number of
responses: shifting manufacturing and financial bases overseas, 15
developing products to accommodate new consumer tastes, 16
internationalizing management teams, 17 and decreasing foreign
investments. 18 Most of these measures, however, only worsen
unemployment and do little to fight deflation.' 9 Conventional means of
corporate governance, such as the organization of companies into groups
of keiretsu, are also proving ineffective in the face of competition from
abroad.2° Deregulation has been widely propounded by the business
15 Kojima Akira, The Japanese Economy Amid Fears of Global Deflation,
JAPAN ECHO, Aug. 1, 2003, available at 2003 WL 19196257 at *5.
Additionally, Japanese companies appear to be cutting costs by reducing
maintenance at domestic manufacturing facilities, accounting for a recent rise in
industrial accidents. Yasuhiro Goto, Is 'Made in Japan'Losing Steam?, NIKKEI
Bus. DAILY, Sept. 16, 2003, available at 2003 WL 56893143 at *1.
16 Digitalization of consumer electronics is one example. Sharp is expected to
outpace electronics giant Sony in television sales by developing new flat screen
televisions. Corporate Fortunes Depend on Response to Structural Changes,
NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Jan. 5, 2004, available at 2004WL 55610180 at *2.
17 Toyota Motor Corp. appointed three non-Japanese to its domestic
management team in 2003. Id. Sony appointed Welsh-born Howard Stringer as
its CEO in March of 2005. See Recharging Sony, WASH. POST, March 12, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 3867312.
18 Since at least late 2003, in expectation of an economic recovery, Japanese
companies have begun to trim overseas investments and transfer capital into
domestic concerns, including manufacturing and telecommunications. Japan's
Manufacturers Plan Big Boosts in Capital Spending, NIKKEI WKLY., Oct. 27,
2003, available at 2003 WL 10477347 at *1 -2.
19 See Hideo Tsuchiya, Japan Should Tackle "Global Deflation" with
Deregulation, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, June 30, 2003, available at 2003 WL
56890131 at *2-3.
20 [Dlomestic recession, unwinding of cross-shareholdings, and
competition in an increasingly global economy are pressuring
Japan to change [its corporate governance practices]. Japan's
ongoing recession has led to an unwinding of cross-
shareholding patterns, which has both opened the door to more
activist foreign shareholders and forced more Japanese firms
to compete directly with foreign firms for capital. Since
global investors increasingly view corporate governance as a
key investment criterion, Japan is being pushed to reassess the
viability of its conventional model.
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community, on the premise that giving private companies more freedom
to act within the market will spur entrepreneurship, increase demand for
products and services, and create jobs.2'
Under the diminished bureaucratic apparatus that necessarily
results from deregulation, companies can no longer count on benevolent
government agencies to protect their interests. Now, after years of
watching the role American lawyers play in protecting the interests of
American companies doing business abroad and at home, Japanese
businesses now appear eager to foster a similar legal environment in
Japan. 2 For example, up to this point, only large international law firms
operating in Japan have generally had the wherewithal to handle the
complex, multi-jurisdictional transaction work that increased global
competition and economic liberalization has brought about. 23 As
expectations of increased foreign capital investment in Japan rise,24
Japan appears eager to handle higher inflows of foreign investment by
using Japanese lawyers. Increasing the number of Japanese lawyers will
strengthen the ability of Japanese businesses to respond to the demands
of foreign investors, who will look to invest not only in Japanese stocks,
but also more directly in Japanese businesses, including through mergers
and acquisitions, partnership agreements, asset securitization, and other
Matthew Senechal, Reforming the Japanese Commercial Code: A Step Towards
an American-Style Executive Officer System in Japan?, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y
J. 535, 545 (2003).
21 Tsuchiya, supra note 19, at 3; see also Okuda Hiroshi, A Business Leader on
the Offensive, JAPAN ECHO, Apr. 1, 2003, available at 2003 WL 19196228 at *6.
22 Tohru Motobayashi, president of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations,
has said that "[t]he role of lawyers is becoming increasingly important for
companies, who now face the need to take business risks on their own
responsibility as a result of deregulation." Lawyers Set To Play Greater
Corporate Role, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Feb. 9, 2004 (on file with the
University of Miami International & Comparative Law Review); see also infra
Part V.A (describing Keidanren's role in pushing for reform of the legal system,
including legal education reform).
23 R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of Japanese Law,
23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 269, 301 (2002).
24 See, e.g., Japan is Flying Again - Japan's Sustainable Recovery, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 2004, available at 2004 WL 62016839 at *1.
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business transactions. 25
Collaboration between Japanese lawyers and foreign lawyers
(gaiben) is strictly regulated by the Japanese Bar,26 which has hindered
Japanese law firms' ability to handle complex international transaction
work. 7 However, as a part of recently adopted reforms, foreign law
25 After the bubble burst in the early 1990s, there was a great
shift in the type of legal services required by global Japanese
companies. In the bubble period all investment activities were
outbound, whereas after the bubble collapsed overseas
companies started to invest in Japan, seeing great
opportunities to expand. That requires Japanese legal
expertise. We can't service our overseas clients without the
assistance of excellent Japanese lawyers.
Yumiko Suzuki, International Law Firm Looks to Cash in on Restructuring,
NIKKEI WKLY., Dec. 2, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25815445 at *2 (statement
of Dale Araki, co-head of O'Melveny & Myers LLP's Tokyo office) ; see also
Jerry Crimmins, Record Crowd Knocks at Law School Doors, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Jan. 13, 2004, at 1.
26 Foreign lawyers who wish to work in Japan "are required to register as foreign
legal consultants (gaikokuho jimu bengoshi, or gaiben), and foreign firms may
neither advise on matters of Japanese law nor employ local lawyers (known as
bengoshi). In addition, gaiben cannot represent clients before a court or other
public body." Japanese Lawyers Scramble to Protect Their Walled Garden,
ASAHI SHIMBUN, Dec 22, 2002 (on file with the University of Miami
International & Comparative Law Review); see also Neil Boyden Tanner, The
Failure of International Law to Internationalize the Legal Profession, 17 J.L. &
CoM. 131, 136 (1997):
Technically, any foreigner is eligible to become a bengoshi in
Japan. However, a foreigner must meet the same requirements
as a Japanese national and go through the same rigorous
testing and interview process in the Japanese language. These
requirements limit the original 25,000 Japanese nationals
seeking admittance each year to the approximately 600
actually admitted. Yet, most foreigners do not seek bengoshi
status because they are either unable to meet the necessary
requirements to obtain the status or because the work they
intend to perform does not require bengoshi status. Most
foreigners wishing to practice in Japan attempt to acquire
status as a gaikokuho jimu bengoshi or "foreign legal
consultant.
27 The Japanese Bar (Nichibenren) passed a measure in 2002 that penalized
Japanese firms that enter into joint ventures with American firms. Misasha
VOL. 13:475
BEYOND LITIGATION
firms with offices in Japan may soon be allowed to hire Japanese staffers
licensed to practice law in Japan. 28 Moreover, in what may be a
significant trend, graduates of the most elite law programs in Japan have
recently been choosing the practice of law over positions in the
bureaucracy. 29 This could well signify that Japanese law firms will soon
be in a position to handle the international legal work that, until now,
they have not had the expertise or manpower to do, and may also signify
that concentrations of power are shifting away from the bureaucracy and
toward the legal system.
B. The End of the Iron Triangle?
1. Outline of the Iron Triangle
The "Iron Triangle" refers to the system of high-level
cooperation among Japanese businesses, politicians, and government
bureaucrats. Since the end of World War II, Japanese politicians have
protected domestic companies from foreign competition by providing
subsidies and tax exemptions for those businesses deemed likely to foster
Japan's economic growth.30 In return, these businesses have contributed
to political campaigns, especially to members of the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP), which has held sway in Japan from the 1950s to today.31
Further, companies have strengthened their ties with the very
government agencies and ministries that regulate them by offering
highly-paid amakudari ("descent from heaven") executive positions to
Suzuki, The Protectionist Bar Against Foreign Lawyers in Japan, China, and
Korea: Domestic Control in the Face of Internationalization, 16 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 385, 397 (2003).
28 Fuyuno, supra note 10, at A18.
29 The number of Kyoto University law graduates who chose legal careers over
careers in the bureaucracy increased from 13% in 1992 to 42% in 2002. Curtis
J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Law's Dominion and the Market for Legal Elites
in Japan, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 451, 474 (2003).
30 See, e.g., Barbara Wanner, Economic Problems, Political Changes Challenge
Japan's Cozy Business-Government Ties, JAPAN ECON. INST. REP. No. 22, June
9, 2000, available at http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIROO/0022f.html#Heading3
(last visited March 17, 2005).
31 The LDP lost its Lower House (sangi-in) majority power for a period in the
mid-1990s, but has always been a dominant member of the ruling coalition. See
J.A.A. STOCKWIN, DICTIONARY OF THE MODERN POLITICS OF JAPAN 148 (2003).
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retiring bureaucrats.32 The amakudari system has insured that companies
hiring retired bureaucrats have ready access to regulatory authorities, and
that those same authorities will have a voice in the corporate
boardroom. 33 Further still, most ex-bureaucrats who run for political
office do so in affiliation with the LDP.34
2. The Iron Triangle and the Legal System
The Iron Triangle has played a direct hand in keeping the
Japanese legal system small. The Japanese government, through both
political leaders and bureaucrats, has consistently encouraged channeling
disputes away from litigation and toward informal bureaucratic
mediation settings.35 More importantly, policies that generously concede
to the Japanese Bar's strict quotas on the number of successful applicants
to the bar exam and to the Legal Research and Training Institute have
proven successful in limiting access to legal counsel, and thereby in
insuring the bureaucracy's retention of power through bureaucratic
32 RICHARD A. COLINGON & CHIKAKO UsuI, AMAKUDARI: THE HIDDEN FABRIC
OF JAPAN'S ECONOMY 3 (2003).
33 Pumendra Jain, The Mythology of Japanese Bureaucracy, JAPAN TODAY,
March 7, 2002, available at http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=
comment&ID= 160 (last visited March 17, 2005).
31 JAPANESE GOVERNANCE: BEYOND JAPAN INC. 7 (Jennifer Amyx & Peter
Drysdale eds., 2003) [hereinafter Amyx & Drysdale].
35 [U]sing various doctrinal and institutional devices and with
varying degrees of success, the Japanese government has
attempted to prevent the development of litigation into an
effective and ongoing vehicle for social change.
One consistent Japanese response to social conflict in any
form is the creation of institutional mediation. Although recent
empirical work casts doubt on its accuracy, the conventional
wisdom has been that disputes are usually resolved by the
informal intervention of a trusted third party, most typically an
older person of higher status. Whether or not such
spontaneous intervention occurs successfully on a regular
basis in contemporary Japan, the continuing belief that is does
makes it politically easier for the government to establish
bureaucratically controlled mediation schemes whenever
informal means fail to prevent serious social conflict.
FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 18 (1987).
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mediation of disputes. 36 However, the government deregulation
discussed above is diminishing the power of Japan's bureaucratic
ministries, and the famed "Iron Triangle" of Japanese businesses,
politicians, and government bureaucrats may be rusting through. This
comment contends that lawyers may be called upon to fill the structural
gap.
3. Fragmentation of the Iron Triangle
Japan's ongoing economic troubles, coupled with increased
competition from abroad, have eroded consensus in both the political and
corporate worlds in Japan. Because both Japan's political and corporate
communities are not as unified as they once were, continued alliances
between these two larger groups appear to be less certain than ever
before in the post-war era.
On the one hand, business interests have split in many sectors.37
Throughout the post-war boom, both large and small businesses
generally agreed about the policies the LDP should follow, including
strict limits on imports and generous, bureaucratically-driven
development programs for domestic interests.38 However, under recent
economic reforms that relax import quotas, encourage inflows of foreign
capital, and liberalize restrictions on big discount stores, there are now
"new requirements in the private sector for information and action that
Japan's lumbering bureaucracy cannot provide quickly enough. 3 1 At the
same time, these economic reforms have caused smaller, less efficient
businesses that have traditionally turned to the LDP for help, such as rice
36 Until recently, the number of applicants allowed to pass the bar (and thereby
gain admission to the Legal Research and Training Institute, a prerequisite for
practicing law) was limited by the Japanese Bar to approximately 1,000 per
year. Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 23, at 294. Even with the new bar exam
being implemented under the recent reforms, the number of successful
applicants will still be limited to under 3,000 per year until at least 2010.
Fuyuno, supra note 10, at A 19.
37 Barbara Wanner, senior political analyst with the now-dissolved Japan
Economic Institute of America, notes that "[t]he twin pressures of recessionary
conditions at home and growth and technological advancement abroad have
splintered and differentiated corporate Japan's interests and priorities, [insiders]
say." Wanner, supra note 30.
38 Peter Landers, Does Japan's Ruling Party Want What It Voted For?, WALL
ST. J., April 25, 2001, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2861430, at *2.
39 Wanner, supra note 30.
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farmers, mom-and-pop stores, and construction companies, to feel that
they can no longer depend on the LDP to protect them from the outside
world and from losing their livelihoods.4° Prime Minister Koizumi,
rather astonishingly, has even said as much.4'
Similarly, political authority has become more fragmented since
the surprise, although temporary, ousting of the LDP from majority
power in 1993, and politicians have increasingly chosen to run on
platforms in opposition to traditional LDP policies.42  In turn, this
political fragmentation has had its effect on the third leg of the Iron
Triangle, the bureaucracy. Lawmakers, in order to protect their policies
against later, unfavorable manipulation by bureaucrats, have begun to
draft legislation, such as the Administrative Procedure Law (described in
Part III.B.2, infra), that is less susceptible to bureaucratic manipulation.43
Furthermore, as Japanese government begins to reflect a U.S.-like
"separation of powers" through political fragmentation, modes of dispute
resolution in Japan have begun to shift away from informal bureaucratic
models and toward adversarial legalism, judicialization, and
formalization."
The Iron Triangle played a significant role in Japan's "economic
miracle" of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. 45 Politicians, companies, and
40 Landers, supra note 38, at *1-2.
41 In a campaign speech, Mr. Koizumi said, "If we are fearful of unemployment
and postpone measures, we will never see the recovery of the Japanese
economy." Id. at *2.
42 This includes many former bureaucrats. Amyx & Drysdale, supra note 34, at
6,7.
43 As the fragmentation of political authority increases (i.e., as
the number of veto players increases), assembling the political
coalitions necessary to reign in the bureaucracy (i.e., to pass
new legislation) becomes more difficult. Recognizing the
likelihood of political gridlock and the durability of
legislation, lawmakers have an incentive to draft legislation in
a manner that will insulate their regulatory policies against
potential manipulation by the bureaucracy ("bureaucratic
drift") or by political forces that may come to power in the
future ("political drift").
Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 23, at 280.
44 Id. at 280, 281; see also infra note 206 (discussing the term "adversarial
legalism" as used by Robert Kagan).
45 Wanner, supra note 30.
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bureaucrats benefited from the arrangement, but not everyone enjoyed
these benefits. Taxpayers ended up footing the bill for government
awards of expensive and often wasteful projects to favored businesses. 6
A cozy relationship between government and large business interests not
only kept regulation informal and policymaking secret, but also limited
the formation and influence of groups that might represent differing
interests, 47 such as smaller businesses and consumer and environmental
groups. It is just such groups that have found themselves empowered
through recent administrative reforms. 8
Political fragmentation has also created more points through
which interest groups can present their cases to the political
establishment. 49 These multiple entry points may well encourage
complex lobbying and litigation strategies as interest groups seek to
make their positions known to lawmakers who have become both less
homogeneous and less constrained by traditional bureaucratic loyalties. °
There are some trends that could call into question whether the
Iron Triangle is truly rusting away. Movement between the bureaucratic
and political worlds appears to have remained stable between 1953 and
the present."1 Further, legislation that called for greater transparency of
the shingikai (secretive "deliberation councils" that have formulated
many of Japan's policies) by requiring that written transcriptions of
council meetings be made public, appears to have lacked enough teeth to
have had any significant effect.5 2  Finally, business contributions to
46 Jain, supra note 33.
47 UPHAM, supra note 35, at 6.
48 See discussion infra Part III. These groups are among those contributing to
increases in litigation.
49 Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 23, at 281.
50 Governments since the 1993 upsets "have paid more attention to broad
consumer needs than ever before," and "for subsequent LDP governments, this
kind of behavior can be attributed to electoral uncertainty, the party's tenuous
hold on Diet proceedings, and the concomitant need to co-operate more closely
with the more 'pro-citizen' opposition parties." PATRICIA L. MACLACHLAN,
CONSUMER POLITICS IN POSTWAR JAPAN: THE INSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES OF
CITIZEN ACTIVISM 243 (2001).
51 COLINGON & USUi, supra note 32, at 160.
52 The resolution requiring published transcripts contains two loopholes: first,
only "general" shingikai (which discuss policy) are required to publish
transcripts, while those shingikai that are "special bodies dedicated to dealing
with specific and sensitive administrative matters such as personnel issues and
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politicians are down, but far from out of the picture. 3
Whether its power is truly diminished or not, by the 1990s, the
metaphor of an "Iron Triangle" of business, political, and bureaucratic
interests operating in unison as "Japan Inc." began to fall out of favor,
replaced by a more nuanced understanding of differentiation and even
competition among these interests. 14 The Iron Triangle has proved
especially, perhaps fatally, vulnerable not only to ongoing economic
recession and the threats of global competition, but also to public outcry
against bureaucratic and political corruption.
C. Corruption and the Call for Reform
The bureaucratic elite have traditionally enjoyed a position of
high regard in Japanese society. Those who run Japan's powerful
ministries, almost invariably graduates of the most prestigious
universities, are considered to be among Japan's most intelligent, hard-
working, and loyal citizens. 5 Importantly, those at the very top of their
respective ministries are generally law graduates of the University of
petitions by particular parties against administrative decisions" are exempt.
Second, the less formal (and uncounted) kondankai ("discussion groups"),
which can spring up more or less spontaneously (as at social gatherings), but
nevertheless reach decisions that have consequences as real as shingikai
decisions, are also exempt from having to publish transcripts of their
proceedings. Gregory W. Noble, Reform and Continuity in Japan's Shingikai
Deliberation Councils, in Amyx & Drysdale, supra note 34, at 118.
53 Business contributions to political parties have sagged since
1994, a trend that the media has attributed to recession-related
belt-tightening. However, insiders link these cutbacks to the
private sector's rising disillusionment with the LDP's ability to
solve the nation's economic problems and to address the
increasingly diverse agenda of big business.
Wanner, supra note 30; see also Hiroshi, supra note 21, at *6. ("[T]here ought
to be a system by which Keidanren can collect money from member
corporations not for a particular political party but for selected legislators who
will implement policies that the business community considers useful, cutting
across party lines. This would signal a shift from party-oriented to policy-
oriented contributions.").
54 COLINGON & USUI, supra note 32, at 135.
55 SUSAN CARPENTER, SPECIAL CORPORATIONS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: WHY




Corruption among bureaucrats was not unheard of prior to the
bursting of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, but public confidence
in the benign governance of Japan's ministries has been shaken by a
seemingly unending series of scandals over the past decade. The
Ministries of Construction, Finance, Labor, and even the venerable
Ministry of Foreign Affairs have all been embroiled in scandals, mostly
involving embezzlement and bribery.57 The National Police Agency
covered up drug use by police officials. 58 The Ministry of Health and
Welfare allowed H.I.V.-tainted blood to be imported into Japan, resulting
in hundreds of people becoming infected through transfusions.5 9 These
scandals provoked a public outcry for political response, including the
administrative reforms discussed below.
Japan's best and brightest, i.e., T5dai law graduates, by
increasingly choosing careers in law over careers in the bureaucracy,
may have sensed that the center of power is shifting away from the
bureaucracy and towards the legal system. 60 Without government
bureaucracies to protect them, ordinary citizens are likely to seek other
means of redress for ills that befall them, including petitioning the
courts.61 Similarly, as the protective power of government bureaucracies
diminishes, Japanese businesses will increasingly turn to lawyers for help
and guidance.62
56 Id. at 74. In fact, Tdai graduates of programs other than law, such as
engineering, often claim that they are discriminated against for the very top
ministerial positions, making a law degree particularly valuable for graduates
with high aspirations but no interest in the actual practice of law. Id.
57 Amyx & Drysdale, supra note 34, at 4.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Milhaupt & West, supra note 29, at 497.
61 Administrative reform in Korea, which has occurred concomitantly with
reforms in Japan, has led to increased litigation rates as citizens seek to take
advantage of new procedural remedies made available through the court system.
See Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling the "Developmental State"?: Administrative
Procedure Reform in Japan and Korea, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 610 (2001).
62 The role of lawyers is becoming increasingly important for
companies, who now face the need to take business risks on
their own responsibility as a result of deregulation, said Tohru
Motobayashi, president of the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations. The era in which the government makes all
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II. Aspects of Japanese Legal Education Reform Related to
Litigation
A. Changes in Litigation Rates
Japan continues to have one of the lowest rates of litigation in
the industrialized world, 63 and is still less litigious than it was eighty
years ago. 64 Nevertheless, it is likely that this low rate of litigation is
more a result of institutional than of cultural constraints.65 There are
signs, however, that Japanese institutions are changing in ways that are
leading to increases in litigation, and thus to increases in the need for
lawyers, prosecutors, and judges. In particular, public calls for both
speeding up the pace of the court system and increasing the judicial
system's responsiveness to public needs will require that the judicial
system increase its effectiveness.66 To this end, law students at the new
law schools will now receive more practical training in litigation and
decisions for the corporate sector is over, with the authorities
shifting focus to ex post facto inspection from regulation with
a view to promoting competition ....
As a result, companies have a great deal of freedom running
their businesses at present. In exchange for that, however, they
have to deal with business risk on their own, and one of the
ways to reduce that risk is to hire professionals, such as
lawyers.
Lawyers Set To Play Greater Corporate Role, supra note 22, at * 1.
63 Frank K. Upham, Weak Legal Consciousness as Invented Tradition, in
MIRROR OF MODERNITY: INVENTED TRADITIONS OF MODERN JAPAN 48, 57
(Stephen Vlastos ed., 1998).
64Id.
65 The debate over the reasons for the relatively low rate of litigation in Japan
continues to this day, but the consensus now seems to favor an institutional
explanation over a cultural one. See, e.g., Setsuo Miyazawa, Taking Kawashima
Seriously: A Review of Japanese Research on Japanese Legal Consciousness
and Disputing Behavior, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 219 (1987). The studies that
sparked the debate are Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in
Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN 41 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed.,
1963) (proposing a cultural basis for Japanese reluctance to litigate), and John
0. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978)
(proposing a political, institutional basis). Id. at 220.66 See discussion infra Part III.B.
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opinion-drafting techniques, and classroom study will be coupled with
moot court exercises and work in legal clinics.
67
While court proceedings in Japan generally are not as lengthy as
those in the United States, there have been public calls for quickening the
pace of both civil and criminal litigation.68 The duration of civil
proceedings in district court averages 9.2 months, but cases involving
any sort of complicated evidence, such as the questioning of witnesses,
average over twenty months in length. 69 The number of civil cases
coming before the courts has almost doubled since 1990: the total
number of civil and administrative cases increased from 1,715,913 in
1990 to 3,298,354 in 2002.70 The number of labor-related cases almost
tripled,7 as did the number of shareholder investment suits. 72 Japanese
judges are spread thinly around the country: approximately 2,000 judges
must oversee 953 summary, family, district, and high courts.73 Some
branch court positions are not permanently filled.74
In a somewhat surprising contrast to the increase in civil cases,
the number of criminal cases in the period from 1990 to 2002 actually
decreased slightly, from 1,693,734 to 1,654,770. 75 Criminal trials are
also generally conducted in much less time than civil trials: only 0.4% of
67 Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 2, at 318.
68 JSRC Report, supra note 12, at ch. I, pt. 1.
69 Id. at ch. II, pt. 1-1. These figures are from 1999. The average length of a
civil trial (median processing time from filing to final verdict or judgment) in
the United States in 1996 was 22.1 months for jury trials and 17.8 months for
bench trials. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin 1
(September 1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdfY
ctcvlc96.pdf (last visited April 1, 2005).
70 Shihou toukei nenhou [Law Statistics Annual Report] (compendium of
statistics maintained by the Japanese Supreme Court), available at
http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/tokei-y.nsf (last visited April
1, 2005) [hereinafter Law Statistics Annual Report].
7' The number increased from 640 in 1989 to 1,802 in 1999. JSRC Report,
supra note 12, at ch. II, pt. 4.
72 See discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
73 John 0. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy
and the Public Trust 3, available at http://law.wustl.edu/Academics/Faculty/
Workingpapers/TheJapaneseJudiciarylO_03.pdf (last visited April 1, 2005).
74 Id.
75 Law Statistics Annual Report, supra note 70.
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criminal trials require more than two years to reach a verdict, as opposed
to 7.2% of civil trials. 76 Nevertheless, criminal trials are often not
conducted on consecutive days. 7 and criminal trials of prominent
politicians and businessmen often take much longer than those of
ordinary citizens. 7' In what is widely viewed as a model for future
criminal prosecutions, Sendai District Court has recently increased the
number of hearings in criminal trials from one per month to one every
two weeks.79
Thus, part of the increased need for lawyers can be attributed to
recent increases in civil litigation. But the increase in the number of civil
cases, while dramatic, can only partly account for the even more
dramatic reforms to the legal education system now being implemented.
B. Accommodating Recent Governmental Reforms
Economic liberalization, global competition, industry
deregulation, political scandal, and demands from the foreign and
domestic business communities have led to a series of administrative and
legal reforms over the past decade. Many problems of the present legal
system are in fact outgrowths of institutional reforms that have increased
or are likely to increase the need for lawyers, i.e., graduates of the new
professional law schools.
1. The Revised Commercial Code
In 1993, in the wake of the collapse of the bubble economy, the
Japanese Commercial Code was amended to allow representatives of
76,4iming for Swifter yet Thorough Justice, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Feb. 11,
2003, available at 2003 WLNR 2335207 (last visited April 17, 2005). Of
course, speed must be balanced with thoroughness, and there are concerns that
Japan's criminal trials compromise the latter for the former. Id.
77 JSRC Report, supra note 12, ch. II, pt. 2-1(2). Holding trials on consecutive
days would ease proposed lay participation in criminal trials.
78 For example, former Construction Minister Kishiro Nakamura was found
guilty of accepting bribes, but he was allowed to retain his seat in the Diet for
the nine years that elapsed before his conviction. Aiming for Swifter yet
Thorough Justice, supra note 76, at * 1.
79 Trial: A Step Toward Faster Litigation, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Nov. 29, 2003




individual shareholders to sue corporate executives. 80 Litigation filing
fees were fixed at the relatively low, uniform amount of 8,200 yen,
which has greatly increased the number of shareholder representative
suits brought in Japanese courts.8' A further amendment to the code in
2002 was designed to increase the accountability of corporate executives
to shareholders by giving Japanese corporations the option of adopting
an "American-style" executive officer system as a means of increasing
the efficiency and reliability of corporate governance systems. 82
The results of the change have been notable. In September 2000,
the executive officers of Daiwa Bank were ordered to pay $775 million
in damages for losses sustained by its New York branch, one of the
largest shareholder compensation suits ever awarded in Japan.83 This
large award, the small uniform filing fee, and the Osaka District Court's
surprising willingness to find causation between the executives' acts and
a foreseeable shareholder loss, all suggest that many more such suits will
follow. 84 And it is not only shareholders who are seeking the aid of
lawyers: corporations themselves are increasingly using lawyers to
argue the legitimacy of their transactions, or to fight administrative
agencies that have taken action against them.85
'o In Japan, both corporations and their executives, including directors, can be
the subject of shareholder lawsuits for security loss compensation. ABE
NAOBUMI & TED TAKAHASHI, ZEN-ZUKAI NIHON NO SHIKUMI: SEIJI, KEIZAI,
SHIHOU-HEN [THE COMPLETE ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO JAPANESE SYSTEMS:
POLITICS, ECONOMICS, LAW AND ORDER] 125 (2001).
81 Id. Before the code revision, the filing fee was based on the amount that the
shareholder-plaintiffs were seeking in the suit. See Carl F. Goodman, The
Somewhat Less-Reluctant Litigant: Japan's Changing View Toward Litigation,
32 LAW&POL'YINT'LBuS. 769, n.128 (2001).
82 Senechal, supra note 20, at 536.
83 Bruce E. Aronson, Reconsidering the Importance of Law In Japanese
Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Daiwa Bank Shareholder Derivative
Case, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1I, 12 (2003).84 Id. at 33.
85 'At a time when shareholders seem ready to file derivative
lawsuits to hold board directors accountable for any loss that
the company has suffered, business corporations will find it
increasingly necessary to protect themselves by filing lawsuits
to fight back against administrative actions,' said a top
executive at a European investment bank in Tokyo. 'If
companies want to battle administrative authorities, they need
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2. The Administrative Procedures Law (APL)
"Administrative guidance" (gyousei shidou) is a term of art that
encompasses bureaucratic suggestions, encouragement, warnings, and
even threats to withhold approval from proposed business activities.
Administrative guidance has been an important means of management of
the post-war Japanese economy, on the one hand praised as a force
behind Japan's "economic miracle," but on the other hand criticized as
both undemocratic and an obstacle to foreign trade. 86 Previously,
Japanese corporate defendants had often used the administrative
guidance they received in informal bureaucratic mediation settings as an
excuse to engage in behavior that would otherwise lead to civil or
criminal liability. 87 Although bureaucratic officials have dubious legal
authority to actually enforce the directives they issue through
administrative guidance, such directives have nevertheless proven
difficult to challenge, especially for foreign business interests. 88
Implemented in 1994, the APL was designed to increase the
transparency of Japanese administrative agencies, and has, at least
marginally, made agencies more accountable to those whom they
the help of a large law firm.'
M&As Give Law Firms the Business, NIKKEI WKLY., July 7, 2003 (on file with
the University of Miami International & Comparative Law Review).
86 STOCKWIN, supra note 31, at 1.
87 Aronson, supra note 83, at 32. The Daiwa Bank case, infra Part III.B.1,
strongly indicates that using poor administrative guidance as a defense for
corporate misbehavior may no longer be available to corporate defendants.
88 The bureaucracy's backbone has long been 'administrative
guidance,' a realm of extralegal directives issued by officials
who have no legal authority to issue or enforce the
instructions. This ostensibly 'cooperative' approach
frequently results in the issuance of threats, express and
implied, to parties deemed insufficiently cooperative. Since
many threats have no basis in law, they are difficult or
impossible to oppose.
David T. Johnson, American Law in Japanese Perspective, LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 771, 787 (2003) (reviewing ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL
LITIGATION: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001))..
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regulate. 89 Under the APL, application, notification, and hearing
procedures have been formalized, requiring agencies to produce in
writing the reasons for any refusal to grant approval or a license to a
party, and requiring inclusion of recommended changes for a party re-
submitting an application.9" The APL was passed under considerable
pressure from foreign business interests, who viewed Japan's opaque
administrative agencies as a barrier to competition. 91 These same
interests will now, along with their attorneys, have greater access to
formalized proceedings, where previously only Japanese firms with the
requisite connections were able to challenge directives they did not
like.92
3. The Products Liability Act
Passed in 1995, this act obviated the need for consumers to prove
a manufacturer's negligence; proof that the product is defective is now
sufficient to recover damages. 93 Although class action suits are still not
allowed in Japan, Japanese consumers are slowly beginning to assert
claims against companies in the court system. 94 Not only has consumer
awareness regarding the safety and quality of the products they buy
increased, but Japanese consumers are now also more aware that unfair
business practices and breaches of consumer contracts may be
actionable.95 Product liability lawsuits, with their inherent human drama,
89 Ken Duck, Comment, Now That the Fog Has Lifted: The Impact of Japan's
Administrative Procedures Law on the Regulation of Industry and Market
Governance, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1686, 1729 (1996).
90 Id. at 1735.
9' Id. at 1726.
92 Japanese agencies nevertheless retain a great deal of authority and discretion,
and challenges to agency decisions are very rarely given a welcome reception in
the courts. Merely obtaining standing to sue remains difficult. See id. at 1706.
Further, the APL, "which was designed by the very agencies it is supposed to
control, is itself the product of a non-adversarial lawmaking process. Not
surprisingly, it has a narrow scope, loopholes galore, and no express sanctions
by which to ensure agencies' compliance." Johnson, supra note 88, at 787.
93 Nancy L. Young, Comment, Japan's New Product Liability Law: Increased
Protection for Consumers, 18 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L. J. 893, 896 (1996).94 Id. at 918.
95 MACLACHLAN, supra note 50, at 243. Some scholars believe that an increase
in consumer litigation is unlikely because the Revised Civil Procedure Code
does not make standing any easier for consumers to obtain. See id. at 248.
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have garnered a great deal of media attention, including lawsuits
concerning contaminated school lunches, a defective tea container, a
baby crib, a boat safety harness, an accounts receivable software
program, tainted orange juice, and even the tobacco industry.96 As
Japanese consumers become more aware of the power of strict liability
lawsuits, manufacturers are taking greater precautions to prevent such
suits, including educating employees in matters of product liability law97
and instituting attorney review of product warning labels. 98 Wider
implementation of such measures will require more attorneys.
4. The Revised Civil Procedure Code
Revisions in 1998 and 2001 have expanded procedures for
collecting evidence and have strengthened the court's ability to order the
production of documents. 99 This reform is meant to increase the
availability of discovery documents to opposing parties. 'oo While
Japanese judges still have somewhat limited ability to force compliance
from an opposing party that refuses a discovery request,' 0 the reform
grants judges the authority to accept as fact allegations as to the contents
of a document withheld after an order to produce. 10 2 The new Code also
granted the Tokyo and Osaka District Courts concurrent jurisdiction for
cases related to intellectual property rights, which have seen notable
increases.1
0 3
96 See Phil Rothenberg, Japan's New Product Liability Law: Achieving Modest
Success, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 453, 483-490 (2000).
9' Id. at 501.98 Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 23, at 320.
99 JSRC Report, supra note 12, at ch. II, pt. 1-1.
'00 Goodman, supra note 81, at 801.
'o' An opposing party is expected to respond to an order to produce documents,
but there is no formal sanction, such as contempt, against non-compliance. ODA,
supra note 4, at 401.
102 Goodman, supra note 81, at 801.
103 The percentage of patent rights cases filed in those two district courts
increased from 66.9% in 1997 to 84.3% in 1999 and to 87.5% in 2000. For
utility model rights cases, the percentage increased from 47.1% in 1997 to
63.9% in 1999 and to 81.4% in 2000. JSRC Report, supra note 12, at ch. II, pt.
1-3(1). "Utility model" patents are available for machines in some countries.




5. The Information Disclosure Law (IDL)
The IDL, similar in spirit to the Freedom of Information Act in
the UnitedStates., was passed in 1999 after twenty years of lobbying
from domestic and foreign business interests and from the United States
government.' n While Japanese government agencies are usually given
judicial deference in cases alleging an agency's failure to accommodate
citizen requests for information, such requests have nevertheless
increased, and agency refusals are increasingly disputed in the courts. °5
Coupled with the Administrative Procedure Law, the IDL insures that
potential litigants have access to written information regarding
bureaucratic interactions with regulated entities. The IDL also weakens
a private sector actor's ability to rely on informal "administrative
guidance" as a defense for irresponsible actions.
0 6
6. The Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL)
The EEOL was enacted in 1985, and was strengthened with
several new provisions in 1997. Although some of these provisions do
not provide convincing means of enforcement, 107 Article 21 of the
amended EEOL recognizes sexual harassment as a legal claim.'0 8 Such
claims had previously been allowed only under a tort theory, relying not
on the EEOL but on the Civil Code.'0 9 In recent years, the number of
sexual harassment cases brought to court has increased, as have the
damage awards from such cases."o
7. The Securities and Exchange Act: Some New Regulatory
Agencies
104 Ginsburg, supra note 61, at 603.
105 Id.
106 Amyx & Drysdale, supra note 34, at 5.
107 For example, employers who show discrimination in recruitment, hiring,
promotion or termination may have their non-compliance "publicized" by the
Labor Ministry, but no further penalty is stipulated. Robbi Louise Miller, The
Quiet Revolution: Japanese Women Working Around the Law, 26 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 207 (2003).
'08 Id. at 205.
'
09 Id. at 192.
'10 A noteworthy example occurred in 2000, when a woman who sued the
Governor of Osaka for sexual harassment was awarded $146,000, the largest
award ever in a sexual harassment suit in Japan. Goodman, supra note 81, at
799.
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Insider trading is being taken more seriously in Japan than it has
been in previous decades."' The creation of the Securities and Exchange
Surveillance System in 1992 and the Financial Services Agency in 2000
has led to increased market surveillance, and suggests that the
government is becoming more serious about enforcing the original 1948
Securities and Exchange Act.' 2 The Japanese government has in fact
shown an increased willingness to prosecute bureaucrats who provide
inside information to those whom they regulate, most famously in 1998,
when a Ministry of Finance (MOF) official was arrested in his office for
disclosing the times and locations of MOF inspections. 13 In a satisfying
twist that ties these administrative reforms together, prosecutors in the
MOF case were able to collect the evidence they needed to indict the
MOF officials by using the expanded information collection procedures
available to them through the Revised Commercial Code and the Revised
Civil Procedure Code.
14
While the above reforms appear to have contributed to an
increase in litigation in Japan, this increase has not been so drastic as to
require thousands of new lawyers or a revamping of the Japanese legal
education system. To understand what many of these new lawyers will
be doing, therefore, one must also examine changes in the business and
social climate of Japan over the past two decades.
IM. Beyond Litigation: Added Value Provided by Lawyers
A. The Added Value of Transaction Cost Engineering
Twenty years ago, Professor Ronald Gilson wrote a seminal
article analyzing how lawyers- particularly business lawyers - add
value to transactions. 115 Rather than viewing lawyers as presenting an
inevitable, and perhaps regrettable, transaction cost in themselves, Gilson
proposed that lawyers are in fact "transaction cost engineers" who
manage the costs and risks that are present whenever two or more parties
"' Richard Small, From Tatemae to Honne: A Historical Perspective on the
Prohibition of Insider Trading in Japan, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
313, 342 (2003).
112 Id. at 351.
113 Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 23, at 312.
114Id.
115 Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239 (1984).
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who wish to deal do not share the same information and expectations
relevant to that deal. 116 Gilson observed that reducing information
asymmetries between parties represents a primary transaction cost of any
deal: using due diligence and negotiation skills, lawyers can both
facilitate the transfer of information between parties and minimize the
cost of acquiring new information, including avoiding duplication. 17 By
structuring agreements and drafting contracts that provide the best deal
not only for their particular client, but for the deal as a whole, a lawyer's
involvement can allow deals to go forward that otherwise might not ever
have occurred."' Furthermore, lawyers act as third-party information
producers whose particular legal analytical skills add a unique value to
many business transactions.' ' 9
Risk management is a second type of transaction cost that
lawyers can engineer. When a party might be reluctant to deal because
of the risks involved, a lawyer's due diligence can manage those risks,
not only providing the parties with a comforting assurance that the deal
can safely go forward, but also increasing the price a party is willing to
pay to go through with a deal. Lawyers thus aid economic efficiency by
providing a better idea of the underlying value of a good or
116 "Lawyers function as transaction cost engineers, devising efficient
mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital asset pricing theory's
hypothetical world of perfect markets and the less-than-perfect reality of
effecting transactions in this world." Id. at 255.
1 7 Id. at 270, 271. "Reducing the cost of acquiring information needed by either
party makes both better off." Id. at 272.18 Id. at 264.
119 For example, "the seller will know whether it has been cited for violation of
environmental or health and safety legislation in the past, but it may require
legal analysis to determine whether continued operation of the seller's business
likely will result in future prosecution." Id. at 274. Legal analysis will also be
required to determine whether existing contracts are assignable or assumable:
The continued validity of the seller's leasehold interests will
depend on whether a change in the control of the seller
operates-as a matter of law or because of the specific terms of
the lease-as an assignment of the leasehold; and the status of
the seller's existing liabilities, such as its outstanding debt, will
depend on whether the transaction can be undertaken without
the creditor's consent.
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transaction.120
A third transaction cost that parties who wish to deal will face
consists of verification costs, i.e., determining (a) whether the other
party's information is misleading, (b) how hard to look for such
information, and (c) how much to spend on its acquisition. The
verification techniques that the parties can practice themselves are
inevitably cumbersome and imperfect,' but a lawyer, as a transaction
cost engineer, knows best how to create a "hierarchy of search effort" in
determining verification costs.1
B. Additional Roles Lawyers Play that Add Value
In addition to the roles of transaction cost engineer and risk
manager, there are numerous other parts that lawyers may play that add
value for investors, businesses and clients. It will be useful to bear these
roles in mind while considering Japan's legal education system reforms.
Lawyers can act as "reputational intermediaries" who "rent out"
their reputations to facilitate transactions between parties who do not
know each other well.2  A lawyer acting as a third-party intermediary
120 "[T]he tie between legal skills and transaction value is the business lawyer's
ability to create a transactional structure which reduces transaction costs and
therefore results in more accurate asset pricing." Id. at 255.
12 For example, such techniques often do not eliminate the incentive of the
other bargaining party to mislead, particularly the seller:
Even the more direct verification technique associated with
the sale of a private company-indemnification arrangements
backed by the withholding of a portion of the purchase price-
will not be completely effective .... If the reduction in value
resulting from complete disclosure exceeds the limit on
indemnification, then indemnification operates. not as bond,
but as bait; a piece of the proceeds is given up in order to
increase the net take. Most troubling to a potential buyer, the
balance of incentives facing owner-managers of a private
seller favors misrepresentation or nondisclosure in precisely
those situations where the information in question would
result in the greatest downward adjustment in the purchase
price. Verification fails in the situation where it is most
needed.
Id. at 288.
122 Id. at 279.
123 Id. at 290-91.
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has a strong incentive to discover and disclose all relevant information at
minimal cost because, "[u]nlike the seller, the intermediary expects
future transactions in which it again will pledge its reputation."', 24 This
same dynamic comes into play when lawyers design novel negotiation
strategies, such as the creation of "hostages," or latent contractual rights
and duties. 2  These strategies not only serve to dissipate opportunism
between contracting parties, but also highlight the use of the lawyer's
reputation as a valuable asset in business transactions, an asset that can
decline sharply in value if the information or due diligence that the
lawyer has provided proves to be wrong.
Perhaps most notably in the post-Enron era, lawyers can act as
"gatekeepers" by certifying that their clients' transactions comply with
relevant legal standards. 126 By performing due diligence for, and by
lending their reputations to, securities issuers, lawyers can assure
investors that all material information that the attorney is aware of
concerning the securities issuer has been properly disclosed, thus
increasing the likelihood of investment.1
27
Lawyers can also identify and structure beneficial strategic
alliances, such as joint ventures, franchises, and distributorships, and can
advise companies on the legal and financial benefits and consequences of
124 /d. at 290.
125 See generally Royce de R. Barondes, The Business Lawyer as Terrorist
Transaction Cost Engineer, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 31 (2000).
126 Sean J. Griffith, Afterward and Comment, Towards an Ethical Duty to
Market Investors, 35 CoNN. L.. REV. 1223, 1224 (2003); see also John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1293, 1297 (2003) ("Structurally, gatekeepers are independent
professionals who are so positioned that, if they withhold their consent,
approval, or rating, the corporation may be unable to effect some transaction or
to maintain some desired status.").
127 Coffee, supra note 127, at 1297. The gatekeeper function can have a very
powerful effect on both investor and client behavior. "[I]n the vast majority of
instances clients will not pursue a transaction if their lawyers say, 'This
transaction is inconsistent with our professional ethics and we cannot
participate."' Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical
Obligation of Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L.
REV. 9, 26 (2003).
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merging with or acquiring other companies. 2 ' Lawyers can add value as
"option brokers" in deal-making, dispute-resolution, and regulatory
negotiations by reducing the cost and maximizing the benefit of
generating options for clients. 129 By using their legal skills to marshal
and order facts, make complex judgments, and understand and
communicate their clients' objectives, business lawyers can help clients
transform large quantities of "information" into useful "knowledge."' 3 °
128 George Dent, Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances, 58 Bus. LAW. 45
(2002). This skill is particularly relevant in twenty-first century Japan as
businesses have increased their M&A activity. See discussion infra.
129 Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's Box?: The Costs of Options in
Negotiating, 88 IOWA L. REv. 601, 639 (2003).
[L]awyer-negotiators, acting on behalf of clients, are more
likely than non-lawyer-negotiators, acting on their own behalf,
to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of option
generation in negotiation. . . .First, lawyers, in contrast to
their clients, are likely to assess decision options according to
rational principles of choice (and evidence suggests that
principals want their agents to evaluate decision options in this
fashion). Second, because lawyers can assess decision options
rationally, they can help clients faced with multiple options
make 'better' decisions at the bargaining table. Finally, and
perhaps more controversially, sophisticated lawyers can use
decision options strategically in negotiation to induce their
counterparts to make desired concessions.
Id. at 606.
130 Peter J. Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First
Century: Adding Value to the Client's Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy, 7
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 17, 38 (2003).
To be optimally useful, information must be customized for
the specific decisions a client must make. Customization
requires isolating and refining only the information necessary
to make the decision at hand and presenting the result in an
understandable and relevant way. By reducing the quantity of
information and by assessing its relevance, value and
reliability, the business lawyer is especially well suited to
perform such customization, which takes knowledge, skill and
careful, meticulous work in the context of an intimate





Indeed, the list of roles that lawyers can be said to play, most of which
add value in one way or another, is quite long. 3' The new Japanese
lawyers can use all of the above strategies to add value to their clients'
transactions.
C. Why the New Japanese Lawyers Are Needed
The term for "lawyer" in Japanese is "bengoshi," but the
functions of a bengoshi are much more limited in scope than the
"lawyer" we think of in English.' Bengoshi are primarily litigators.'
But many of the legal areas that are a routine part of litigation practices
in the United States, such as personal injury, medical malpractice, and
divorce and custody matters, are not normally part of a bengoshi's
practice in Japan. 34 More importantly, corporate transactions, especially
131 A lawyer, it has been said, is an agent, alter ego, alter id,
artisan, business associate, colleague, conscience, free-lance
bureaucrat, friend, rhetorician (or, less flatteringly,
mouthpiece), statesman, technician, therapist, transaction cost
engineer, and translator; and lawyers as a group, additionally,
have been described as tricksters, heroes, helpers, champions,
godfathers, gurus, and hired guns.
Robert J. Condlin, "What's Love Got to Do With It?"- "It's Not Like They're
Your Friend for Christ's Sake ": The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer
and Client, 82 NEB. L. REV. 211, 222-224 (2003).
132 In addition, the more general English word "attorney," which can include
prosecutors and public defenders as well as private lawyers, is usually translated
into Japanese as bengoshi, which further adds to the confusion about how
"lawyers" differ from bengoshi.
133 "[T]he practice of Japanese bengoshi is relatively pure, technically narrow
legal work involving court-related disputes with a fair amount of money at
stake. Medium-sized industrialists and those involved in a limited range of real
estate transactions are the overwhelming beneficiaries of the services of
bengoshi." Michael K. Young, Foreign Lawyers in Japan: A Case Study in
Transnational Dispute Resolution and Marginal Reform, 21 LAW IN JAPAN, 84,
102 (1988).134 /d. A great deal of "legal" work in Japan is carried out by non-bengoshi who
specialize in tax, patents, and administrative or private document drafting.
These professionals generally have their own examination and licensing
practices and may often have undergraduate law degrees, but they are not
included in calculations of the number of "lawyers" in Japan.
While the most current statistics show that there are only
15,933 bengoshi in Japan, there are also 3,829 benrishi [patent
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international transactions, are not something in which a bengoshi will
normally take part, whereas "lawyers" routinely take part in such
transactions in the West. 135 The recent legal education reforms may
signal a broadening of the traditional bengoshi practice that foreigners
now often perform.1
36
Perhaps presciently, Professor Gilson concludes his 1984 article
with a discussion of the relative dearth of lawyers in Japan, and it is here
that twenty years of hindsight may serve to clarify part of the reason
Japan is now eager to increase the number of practicing lawyers, and
why these lawyers may practice law in a broader fashion than most
present bengoshi. 13' Gilson notes that the lifetime employment system
(shuushin koyou) in the Japanese business world, combined with
seniority-based promotion (nenkou joretsu), creates conditions wherein
the opportunism of individual actors is constrained by strong cultural and
social ties. 38 Individual actors can be certain to continue to encounter
the same people year after year in future dealings, and their prospects
both for future business success and for promotion will depend on
maintaining good relationships and trustworthy reputations."' In this
agents] 62,280 zeirishi [tax agents], 16,981 shiho shoshi
[private document drafters] and 35,659 gyosei shoshi
[administrative document drafters]. Thus, the total number of
attorneys in Japan, depending on the criteria used in the
calculations, can vary from 15,933 to 134,682.
Tanner, supra note 26, at 135
135 Young, supra note 134, at 103. There are, of course, Japanese international
transactional lawyers, or shogai bengoshi, but they are relatively few in number:
[I]t is estimated that there are as few as 500 bengoshi
specializing in international transactions [out of the 20,000 or
so bengoshi in Japan]. Such an excess of demand over supply
for the services of shogai bengoshi has caused many of the
larger firms of corporate solicitors from America and England
to try to establish practices in Japan.
Jason Comrie-Taylor, The 'Appropriate' Role for Foreign Trainees in Japan, 15
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 323, 325 (1997).
136 Japanese Lawyers Scramble to Protect Their Walled Garden, supra note 26,
at *2 ("[T]here are also plans to train bengoshi as facilitators of business and
thus enable them to occupy the same territory as their Western counterparts.").
137 Gilson, supra note 115, at 306.
131 Id. at 309.
139 Id. at 309-10.
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context, the dense, complicated written contracts that characterize
American business dealings, as well as the lawyers who draft them, are
seen as unnecessary or even damaging to relationships based on trust.
In contrast, many business parties in the U.S. are well aware that
they may never deal with, or even see, each other again. Hence, in a
country where lifetime employment is a distant memory, and where
promotion depends less on an individual's seniority than on his or her
proven track record, opportunism (i.e., the potential for cheating of one
kind or another) is constrained through lengthy, detailed contracts that
spell out exactly what will happen if things go wrong. And legions of
American business lawyers are happy to help spell out the details in
writing.
In twenty-first century Japan, employment conditions have been
changing, and with these changes, the Japanese may have come to see
lawyers as a means of replacing social systems that are gradually
eroding. Lifetime employment and seniority-based promotion are now
on the decline in Japan. 140 Thus, the importance that reputation and
"face" (mentsu) have traditionally played in Japanese business dealings
may now be supplemented or replaced by the professional "reputations-
for-hire" of lawyers and other professionals. The Japanese businesses
that have promoted reform of the Japanese legal education system no
doubt foresee that they will benefit from a broadening of "what a
140 See, e.g., David Pilling, Japanese Industries Hire More Temporary Workers,
FIN. TIMES ASIA, May 5, 2004, available at 2004 WL 77448826 (finding that
the use of temporary staff has been growing as companies have shifted from the
lifetime employment model); Peter Rowe, The Honeymoon May Be Over: In
'Japan Unbound,' John Nathan considers a cooling U.S.-Japan Relationship,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., March 14, 2004, available at 2004 WL 58986329
(book review) (stating that corporations are increasingly breaking the promise of
lifetime employment; Suvendrini Kakuchi, Economy-Japan: Some Good
Figures Buoy Hopes for Recovery, INTER PRESS SERVICE, March 1, 2004,
available at 2004 WL 59282803 (quoting a professor of international economics
at Toin Yokohama University as saying "that the good old days of lifetime
employment and high salaries are gone"); Japan Risk: Labour Market Risk,
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT RISKWIRE, May 17, 2004 (on file with the
University of Miami International & Comparative Law Review); see also Simon
Learmount, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM JAPAN
99 (2002) ("Before, the age element [in the nenkou system] was far more
important than the skill element, but now the skill/responsibility side is growing
quickly.").
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bengoshi does" to include more business law and more transaction cost
engineering. 141
This need for more Japanese business lawyers is particularly
visible in the area of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), where foreign
lawyers can no longer handle the workload by themselves. 42 M&A
activity is on the rise in Japan,143 and is likely to continue increasing now
that the Commercial Code has been amended to allow a company to buy
a target firm for cash or by paying with shares of another firm.14 4 Not
141 Historically, "practice" in Japan has meant the activities of
judges, prosecutors and litigators. "Practice" has not generally
referred to providing counseling and drafting services. Many
of the individuals behind the present reform are believed to
adopt this narrow view of practice. However, other reformers
-particularly those from industry-are more likely to find the
benefits of practical legal education in advanced business law
subjects, such as antitrust, intellectual property, and
international business transactions.
Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 2, at 317.
142 Hamstrung by red tape, the 100 or so foreign lawyers working
in Japan complain that they are unable to fulfill much-needed
business in such growth areas as mergers and acquisitions ....
The shortage [of Japanese lawyers] is felt in far-reaching
ways, resulting in too many companies chasing too few legal
advisers, the experts said. "This shortage does have a profound
adverse effect on the ability to complete sophisticated cross-
border transactions in the Japanese market," according to
[Robert] Grondine. Lawyers are needed more than ever in
Japan as international corporate deals explode after years of
inactivity.
Francoise Kadri, Lawyer Jokes No Laughing Matter for Japan,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, June 11, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2813909
at *1.
143 Rehab at Heart of Mounting M&As by Investment Funds, ASAHI SHIMBUN,
Nov. 24, 2003 (on file with the University of Miami International &
Comparative Law Review) ("The sudden rise in M&A activity is attributed to
the growing popularity of rehabilitating struggling corporations, in which
investors plunk down finances to reorganize a faltering firm's operations with
the aim of making the company, and therefore themselves, profitable.").
144 Government Mulls Allowing Use of Foreign Shares, Cash For Corporate
Buyouts, NIKKEI REP., June 6, 2004 (on file with the University of Miami
International & Comparative Law Review). The new law, which will go into
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only are foreign firms looking to acquire both troubled and healthy
Japanese companies, 145 but Japanese firms are increasingly initiating
M&As in order to secure their places in industrial sectors undergoing
realignment as a result of global competition. 46 As M&As become more
widespread and complex, Japanese companies will need the expertise of
outside professionals, including lawyers.
47
The increases in the demand for lawyers means that graduates of
the new Japanese law schools can look forward to acting as advisors or
intermediaries in business deals, helping with the restructuring or
resuscitating of companies under corporate or civil rehabilitation laws, 148
and working as intermediaries to help businesses acquire failing
companies. 49 Much like their Western counterparts, but unlike their
bengoshi predecessors, many of the new lawyers will likely be
performing due diligence to assess the quality of prospective securities
and other assets between two companies that wish to integrate
operations. Even at Japan's largest law firm, there are not yet enough
lawyers to handle requests for speedy work in this area.' 50
effect in 2007, was approved after extensive lobbying by U.S. and Japanese
business interests to ease rules on M&A deals in Japan, and can be viewed as
part of Prime Minister Koizumi's commitment to increase foreign investment in
Japan. Id.
14 "With the economy recovering and listed Japanese firms expecting the third
straight year of profit growth, the era in which only troubled firms were the
target of foreign acquisitions is over. Instead, foreign companies are increasingly
targeting blue-chip firms, particularly in the pharmaceutical, household goods
and food sectors." Japan Firms Brace for Spate of M&As by Foreign Giants,
NIKKEI WKLY., May 31, 2004, available at 2004 WL 65446116 at *1.
146 Such sectors include food, pharmaceuticals, electronics, and cosmetic goods.
Id at *2.
147 Lawyers Set To Play Greater Corporate Role, supra note 22.
148 Lawyers Expand Corporate Rehabilitation Services, NIKKEI REP., July 3,
2003 (on file with the University of Miami International & Comparative Law
Review).
149 Id.
150 In late 2003, eight lawyers from the law firm of Nagashima Ohno &
Tsunematsu (itself the product of a merger of two firms, now having 159
lawyers) gave up their New Year's holiday in order to complete a request from
Nissho Iwai Corp. and Nichimen Corp., two general trading houses, to evaluate
the two companies' respective assets and financing plans. M&As Give Law
Firms the Business, supra note 85, at *2. "An executive of Nissho Iwai and
Nichimen requested speedy work, saying: 'Our stock price will fall if the
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Another area in which the new lawyers will be in demand is in
the disposal of bad bank loans. Japanese banks are still swimming in bad
loans made over the course of the last decade, and banks increasingly
wish to dispose of these loans, often on the foreign market. Lawyers can
provide the legal advice needed to sell such loans to foreign investors.' 5'
Intellectual property rights represent yet another area in which
the demand for legal help outstrips the supply. 5 2 Corporate Japan has
come to see that in-house counsel cannot meet the needs of twenty-first
century Japan in this area, and the laws concerning partnerships with
foreign law firms are proving disadvantageous to efficient handling of
not only intellectual property, but other business matters as well. 53 This
process is delayed. Please get the work done in one month."' Id.
151 Even foreign law firms operating in Japan need to hire Japanese legal help to
provide banks with competent advice for disposal of bad loans.
Paul Hastings [a U.S. law firm] started Japanese law services
from scratch in 1998 by setting up Taiyo Law Office. Riding
on the current of bad-loan disposals by Japanese banks, the
firm increased earnings through legal advice to U.S. investors
who were buying bad loans. It now employs twenty-one
Japanese lawyers.
Hajime Matsuura & Mariko Kodaki, Lawyer Shortage has Law Firms
Scrambling, NIKKEI REP., Nov. 3, 2003, available at 2003 WL 65954273 at *2.
152 "'We must rely on headhunters, because it's too time-consuming for us to
find our own specialists in patent, intellectual property rights and other
promising areas,' said a senior partner of a large law firm." Id.
153 'Historically, Japanese companies have tended to look to their
in-house legal departments,' said Atsushi Naito, a Japanese
copyright lawyer. 'Because of so-called globalization, they
have had to do a lot of deals with foreign companies,' he said.
'They are beginning to feel the need for lawyers and have
acknowledged those needs.' But those needs cannot be
fulfilled under Japan's 'joint enterprise law,' which limits
foreign law firms' practice to setting up a joint venture with a
local partner, according to [Laurent] Dubois [a French lawyer
practicing in Tokyo]. Non-Japanese lawyers are also
forbidden from attaining the coveted rank of 'bengoshi,'
which allows them to appear in courts. The law 'has worked
against Japanese lawyers because they cannot create proper
partnerships with US companies, but Americans can learn in
Japanese law firms and then handle a company even though
they are not fully authorized to work,' Dubois said. 'The fact
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is not a surprise for those who have noted that the market for business
law services in Japan is now estimated to be approximately 100 billion
yen per year, an increase of 100% since 1998.154 In this context, the fact
that sixty-eight new law schools opened in one year begins to make more
sense.
Interestingly, it appears likely that many of these new lawyers
will work in law firms rather than as in-house counsel. Japanese law
firms are now constantly seeking lawyers to hire, even employing
headhunting firms to seek out qualified lawyers, a very new development
in Japan.1 55 Japanese corporate legal departments have also been hiring
more employees in recent years,'56 but most of these new hires continue
to be non-bengoshi,157 which presents a contrast with American corporate
legal departments. 158
that Japanese firms are trying to protect themselves is working
against them.'
Kadri, supra note 143, at *2.
154 Law Firms Seek Mergers to Offer 'One-Stop Service', NIKKEI REP., July 2,
2003 (on file with the University of Miami International & Comparative Law
Review).
155 See Matsuura & Kodaki, supra note 152.
156 Recent survey data show that the average number of
employees in the legal department per corporation [increased]
from 5.2 in 1990, to 6.1 in 1995, to 6.4 in 2000. The same
survey shows that the total number of legal employees hired
by firms mid-career is increasing, from 181 persons at 115 of
888 surveyed firms in 1995 to 491 persons at 290 of 1,008
firms in 2000. Another survey showed that in the next five
years, 47% of firms planned to increase the size of their legal
staff, while only 4.2% planned to shrink it."
Milhaupt & West, supra note 29, at 476-77.
157 A 2004 Japan Federation of Bar Associations survey of bengoshi found only
1.3% responded "yes" to the question, "Are you an in-house bengoshi
(employed by a corporation)?" Japan Federation of Bar Associations, at
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/jp/katsudo/toukei/sensasu.html (last visited April
3, 2005).
158 See, e.g., Jason F. Cohen, The Japanese Product Liability Law: Sending a
Pro-Consumer Tsunami Through Japan's Corporate and Judicial Worlds, 21
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 108, n.89 (1997). ("Most Japanese companies have a
department or section handling legal matters. Of the employees who staff these
departments, 60% studied law as their undergraduate major, according to a
survey. The survey also indicated that only 4% of the companies had a licensed
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Nevertheless, law firm hiring continues apace, as does
businesses' hiring of outside counsel, 5 9 and there are indications that
companies will be hiring more bengoshi to work directly for them.' 
60
This marked increase in the hiring of legal help for business transactions
appears to have arisen precisely because non-bengoshi with
undergraduate law degrees are no longer adequate for the types of
transactions in which Japanese corporations now wish to engage.
Professionally-educated lawyers can provide the reputational capital, as
well as the negotiation and due diligence skills, that Japanese
corporations have come to recognize as necessary in the contemporary
global marketplace.
Much as it did after World War II, Japan finds itself struggling to
compete internationally, only now its ancient social mores (reliance on
community reputation; an elite but admirable bureaucracy; the
importance of "face") and post-war business practices (lifetime
employment; seniority-based promotions; keiretsu; the "Iron Triangle")
attorney working in their legal departments. In contrast, legal departments in the
United States are almost completely staffed by attorneys.") (citations omitted).159 Law firm mergers are notably on the increase as well. Japanese law firms
have traditionally been of the small, "boutique" variety, but firms now seek to
be able to provide clients with legal multiple services.
Law firms, for their part, are now required to handle work,
including back-office operations, such as preparation and
filing of documents, in large quantities and very quickly as
well. Now is the time when business size seems to be crucial
for law firms to establish a competitive edge in the domestic
legal market.
Law Firms Seek Mergers to Offer 'One-Stop Service', supra note 155.
'60 Of course, many of these new hires might represent litigators as well as
transactional attorneys:
On the practitioner side, the number of Japanese companies
hiring licensed attorneys as in-house counsel has been
gradually increasing. Traditionally, Japanese companies hired
outside counsel to represent them in litigation (partially
because there are not many licensed attorneys in Japan).
Recently, however, more and more companies are interested
in preventing disputes from arising and are hiring licensed
attorneys to specialize in that area.
Shiro Kawashima & Susumu Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in




are fading from view. Perhaps the new law schools will produce
graduates who can serve as trustworthy gatekeepers, risk managers, and
transaction cost engineers, and who can thereby restore some of the value
of reputation in Japanese business transactions.
IV. The Players: The Entities Behind the Call to Reform
The recent legal education reform directives should further be
viewed in the context of the expressed desires of the entities that have an
interest in the types of social, economic and political changes to which
reform in Japanese legal education will likely lead.
A. The Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren)
Keidanren is an organization that represents the interests of
Japanese businesses, industrial associations, and employers. 16  After the
Second World War, Japanese business interests, voicing their concerns
and recommendations through Keidanren, worked closely with the
government to bring Japan to a position of economic preeminence.
162
Keidanren continues to be a powerful lobbying group today.
Keidanren has spoken out on judicial reform, submitting a
number of proposals to the Ministry of Justice at the behest of the Liberal
Democratic Party in 1998.163 These proposals were motivated by a
desire on the part of corporate Japan not only to make the court system
easier and less costly to access, but also to create "a civil justice system
better able to state the contours of the legal versus the illegal, to lessen
161 In May 2002, Keidanren merged with Nikkeiren (The Japan Federation of
Employers' Associations) to become Nippon Keidanren, with a total
membership of 1,623 organizations. See Nippon Keidanren, available at
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/profile/pro00l.html (last visited April 3,
2005). For simplicity, this comment will refer to the organization as Keidanren,
which was the organization's name when it made the proposals discussed here.
162 "Most observers of Japan's post-1945 transformation from a devastated, war-
tom nation into the world's second-largest economic power have attributed this
stunning turnaround in large part to the extraordinary level of cooperation
between business and government in pursuing the shared goals of growth and
prosperity." Wanner, supra note 30.
163 Toward a Revitalization of the Civil Justice System , available at
http://www.21ppi.org/english/policy/19981222/summary.html. (last visited
April 3, 2005) [hereinafter Revitalization]. It was published by The Twenty-
First Century Public Policy Institute, a think-tank funded by Keidanren, on
December 22, 1998. Id.
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growing risk exposure, and to promote business planning."' 164 Among
these was a proposal to establish graduate professional schools for the
study of law.
Interestingly, however, Keidanren also submitted a number of
proposals regarding legal reform aimed at loosening the restrictions on
non-bengoshi legal professionals, especially those who already work
within corporations. First, Keidanren proposed that corporate legal staff
members be allowed to represent their own companies in litigation.
161
Second, non-bengoshi legal professionals, such as tax agents, patent
agents, and judicial scriveners should be allowed to handle routine legal
affairs. 166 Finally, corporate legal staff members, Diet members, and
their policy assistants should be able to practice as attorneys after passing
the National Bar Examination, but without having to complete a Legal
Research and Training Institute apprenticeship.
67
Nevertheless, despite the expanded role recommended for non-
bengoshi, the Keidanren proposals contain no recommendation that the
number of non-bengoshi should be increased. Viewed in this context,
Keidanren's proposal that new graduate law schools be established to
train more bengoshi suggests that the business community of Japan is
concerned with increasing the efficient handling of legal matters through
the use of professionally-trained lawyers.
This concern can be further inferred from Keidanren's proposals
164 Luke Nottage, Japan's Impending Reform of the Administration of Justice:
Far from Final, 48 CCH ASIAWATCH NEWSLETTER, Aug. 2001, available at
http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/Iuken/asiawatch48.htm (last visited April 3, 2005).
165 Revitalization, supra note 164.
166 Keidanren proposed that
judicial scriveners (specializing in corporate documentation
and real estate transactions) be allowed to appear as counsel in
Summary Court proceedings; patent attorneys be able to
appear in patent infringement proceedings in conjunction with
bengoshi; tax attorneys be able to give evidence as a matter of
course, provided a bengoshi is of counsel; similar possibilities
be considered for administrative scrivener, social security
advisors, and others.
Nottage, supra note 165.
167 "[C]orporate counsel who have passed the bar examination (but not been
through the state-sponsored further training to qualify as bengoshi, judges or
prosecutors) should be allowed to qualify as bengoshi after some years working
in the private sector." Id.
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concerning judges. Specifically, not only should the number of judges
be increased, but judges should be appointed from among practicing
attorneys.168 Many Japanese judges join the judiciary fresh from their
training at the Legal Research and Training Institute. Thus, while they
may have undergraduate degrees in law, the bulk of their legal training
will have taken place in bar exam cram schools. 69 Most of these judges
then stay on the bench for the rest of their careers. 70 The business
community perceives such judges, who lack business education or work
experience, as incapable of understanding contemporary business and
professional practices. 17' For these reasons, Keidanren proposed that
judges be appointed from among practicing attorneys who are familiar
with the contours of business disputes, and that future judges undertake
training in non-legal fields, primarily the sciences, in order better to
understand intellectual property cases. 72 In what may be a related trend,
the number of judges who have been deemed unfit for reappointment has
dramatically increased.1
73
Keidanren's proposals for reform also contain provisions for
improving the judicial infrastructure to increase access for ordinary
citizens, as well as for increasing funding for legal aid. However, these
proposals could well have been included not so much to increase access
for ordinary citizens, but to make the proposed reforms of more obvious
use to the greater public. 74
168 Revitalization, supra note 164.
169 Miyazawa, supra note 5, at 493.
170 Approximately three-quarters of the judges appointed from the 1970 LRTI
graduating class were still on the bench in 1996. See Haley, supra note 73, at 5.
171 See Goodman, supra note 81, at 806.
172 Revitalization, supra note 164.
173 Six judges were denied reappointment in 2003. Judge Not, Lest ye be
Judged, THE DAILY YOMIURJ, Dec. 10, 2003, available at 2003 WL 66820619.
Prior to 2003, only two judges had ever been denied reappointment. See Haley,
supra note 73, at 5.
174 To promote this type of reform proposal to the public, .
business groups and conservatives needed other elements in
the package that would satisfy the needs of ordinary people.
Hence, the strengthening of legal aid, for instance, has been
included in the proposal.
Whether this hypothetical explanation is correct or not, it is
clear that business groups and, to a lesser extent, LDP
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B. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
Japan's dominant political party established a commission to
examine the likely needs of the judicial system in the twenty-first
century, issuing a report in June of 1998.175 The research group's report
acknowledged that economic liberalization and deregulation would
increase the needs of Japanese citizens and businesses for a responsive
judiciary.176 An increase in the number of legal professionals was also
seen as necessary to accommodate proposed increases of civil and
criminal legal aid services, multi-disciplinary law partnerships, and
judicial review of administrative agencies. 177 To meet these needs, the
number of judges, prosecutors, and bengoshi should be increased,
primarily by expanding the legal education system and by reforming it to
incorporate the kind of practical legal training emphasized in U.S. law
schools. 178
C. The Judicial System Reform Council (JSRC)
1. Formation of the JSRC
In response to the above proposals put forward by Keidanren and
the LDP, the Diet enacted a law in 1999 calling for the formation of a
thirteen-member committee to formulate policies that would strengthen
the judicial system and make it more responsive to the public. 179 The
members represented the legal profession, legal scholars, business
interests, educators, labor unions, and consumers. 180 Significantly, only
politicians are indicating that people need more access to the
law.
Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Judicial Reform in Japan: The Rule of Law at
Last?, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 19, 102 (2001).
7- ]JAW1-N. 2 1 -MWO)WIMCD 7,t r* [The Report of
the Special Research Group of the Judicial System: Concrete Policy for the
Judiciary in the 21st Century], June 16, 1998, available at





179 Miyazawa, supra note 175, at 105, 106.
80 Id. at 106.
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three council members were members of the Japanese Bar, the
organization that heretofore had had the dominant voice as to the
direction of Japanese legal education.'8
Three law professors were appointed to the council, including its
chair, Koji Sato of Kyoto University. Professor Sato was known for his
previous proposals to establish graduate schools for legal education, as
well as for his outspoken views concerning administrative reform as a
means of increasing the participation of Japanese citizens in the legal
system, thereby realizing the true "rule of law" in Japan. 82 The council
also included Kohei Nakabo, a lawyer who was well known in Japan for
his strong character, exemplified by his willingness to take on organized
crime in order to collect bad debts for the government after the bursting
of the housing bubble in the 1990s.1
83
2. JSRC Recommendations
On June 12, 2001, the JSRC presented its final report to the
Cabinet.' 84 The underlying reasons for the proposed reforms, namely,
the recent social and economic changes that have led to the need for
judicial reform, are described in quite broad and idealized terms. Facing
"difficult conditions," the report explains, "Japan ... has been working
on various reforms, including political reform, administrative reform,
promotion of decentralization, and reforms of the economic structure
such as deregulation," with reform of the judicial system aimed at
"t[ying] these various reforms together organically under 'the rule of
law' that is one of the fundamental concepts on which the Constitution is
based.' ' 185 There are somewhat oblique references to the actual human
181 id.
182 Id.; see also infra note 186.
183 Brian Bremner, The Toughest Job in Japan, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 25, 2002,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_08/b3771147.
htm (last visited April 5, 2005). Nakabo, although a widely admired figure,
recently stepped down as president of the Resolution and Collection
Corporation, established by the government to collect bad debts, because some
employees had been found to have taken bribes. See Nakabo to Quit Bar Over
Loan Fraud Case, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 10, 2003, available at 2003 WL
60237077.
184 JSRC Report, supra note 12.
185 Id. at ch. I. The aspirational language and ideology of the chair, Professor
Sato, comes through clearly in this prefatory passage:
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needs and socioeconomic realities, such as bureaucratic corruption and
globalization, that inspired the call for reform in the first place: "[S]ocial
conditions are changing domestically and internationally every moment,
becoming more complicated, sophisticated, diversified and
internationalized." 186 The report emphasizes that Japanese society's
ability to respond to globalization should be fostered by clarifying legal
rules in such a way as to ease the resolution of "various disputes" and
"prevent those in a weak position from suffering unfair disadvantage in
connection with the abolition or deregulation of advance control."'
' 87
To meet these laudable but rather hazily-defined goals, the JSRC
Report recommends a number of changes to the legal system: increasing
the number of professionals in the legal system, reforming legal
education, establishing postgraduate law schools,' 88 and increasing the
number of successful applicants for the new national bar examination to
3,000 per year (up from the current 1,000) by 2010.189 The JSRC
recommendations also include reducing the duration of civil proceedings
by about half by shortening the intervals between trial dates, which in
turn is to be accomplished by "expanding the human base of the legal
profession" through increases in the number of lawyers, judges, and legal
staff, and through "promoting the incorporation of law firms and the use
of joint law firms."' 90
Also, courts should become quicker to secure expert witnesses in
cases requiring technical expertise, such as medical malpractice and
intellectual property cases, and lawyers themselves should become more
proficient in technical matters through their legal training and through
the expansion of specialized departments in incorporated law firms. 9'
What commonly underlies these reforms is the will that each and
every person will break out of the consciousness of being a
governed object and will become a governing subject, with
autonomy and bearing social responsibility, and that the people
will participate in building a free and fair society in mutual




86 Id. at ch. I, pt. 1.
187 Id. at ch. I, pt. 2-1.
188 Id. at ch. III, pt. 2-2.
189 Id. at ch. I, pt. 3-2(2).
190 Id. at ch. II, pt. 1-1(3).
191 Id. at ch. II, pts. 1-2, 1-3.
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District courts and family courts should be granted expanded jurisdiction
to hear diverse matters pertaining to divorcing parties. 192 To make
lawsuits less burdensome to file, fees should be reduced, and losing
parties should be made to pay attorney's fees.19 3 Civil legal aid will have
to be expanded to meet the mandate of the new Civil Legal Aid Law No.
55, passed on October 1, 2000.194 The implementation of class action
lawsuits should also be considered. 195 In the criminal law system, public
defense of suspects, including the right to counsel, should be
instituted. 196 As to Japan's response to globalization, there is a
suggestion that the rules governing collaboration between Japanese and
foreign lawyers (gaiben) should be relaxed, and "continued
consideration" should be given to abolishing the prohibition on
employment of Japanese lawyers by foreign law firrs.' 97
Thus, reform of Japanese legal education through the
establishment of graduate law schools and increasing the bar passage rate
are just two of the many JSRC recommendations. These two particular
reforms are noteworthy in that they are, after years of talk and debate,
finally being implemented. These nearly-radical reforms in a
conservative country like Japan make sense only in the much broader
context of the many other administrative reforms that have been
implemented in response to economic stagnation, scandal, shifts in the
loci of power, and the demands of the Japanese corporate community.
V. Difficulties and Likely Effects of Legal Education Reform
While the need for reform of the Japanese legal education system
has been widely recognized, questions and disagreements as to the
details have inevitably arisen among legal scholars and practicing legal
professionals.
192 Id. at ch. II, pt. 1-5.
193 Id. at ch. II, pts. 1-7(l)(a) and (b).
19' Id. at ch. II, pt. 1-7.
'9' Id. at ch. II, pt. 1-7(4)(b).
196 Id. at ch. II, pt. 2-2(1)(a).
197 Id. at ch. II, pt. 3-4. That consideration was in fact given to the loosening of
restrictions on gaiben can be seen in the recent announcement that foreign law
firms with offices in Japan will be allowed to hire Japanese lawyers beginning in
the summer of 2005. See Fuyuno, supra note 10, at A18.
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A. Keeping the Bar Admissions Quota
Observers of Japanese legal education reform have noted that
retention of a quota on the number of successful applicants to the
Japanese bar indicates that the current reforms are not as profound as
they may first appear.19" The goal of graduating 3,000 new lawyers from
the Legal Research and Training Institute (LRTI)' 99 each year by 2010
may well be difficult to meet, 2° making this administrative reform
insufficiently responsive to the immediate problems posed by global
competition and the demands of Japanese businesses for more access to
legal counsel.
Further, maintaining the LRTI as an institution presents several
concerns, although these are perhaps more ideological than educational.
First, continuing to impose the requirement that all new lawyers pass
through the LRTI apprenticeship shows a certain non-responsiveness to
the immediate economic and societal changes that have ostensibly
prompted the reforms outlined above: instead of allowing the number of
new lawyers each year to be determined by societal need or individual
vocation, the number will be determined by the spaces available at the
LRTI.2 °1 Second, limiting the number of new lawyers to the number of
available LRTI seats may perpetuate the notion that the law is an
exclusive, elitist endeavor open only to a select few, most of whom will
end up choosing to remain in Tokyo rather than practicing in those
prefectures where the shortage of lawyers is more acute.2 °2 Finally,
sending all of Japan's lawyers, judges, and prosecutors through what is
198 'The motivation for the change was certainly pure,' says
Curtis J. Milhaupt, director of the Center for Japanese Legal
Studies at Columbia University School of Law. 'But I think a
fundamental reform of Japanese legal education and legal
profession will only come when the quota of the bar exam is
lifted.'
Id. at Al8.
199 The details of the LRTI apprenticeship program are discussed supra notes 6,
7, and 36.
200 Because of the difficulty of tweaking the bar exam to insure that the "correct"
number of applicants pass, a more realistic timeframe might be twenty to
twenty-five years. See Robert F. Grondine, An International Perspective on
Japan's New Legal Education System, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 13, 14
(2001).




in effect a single, centralized school creates a system that, while perhaps
producing predictable outcomes in the country's courts, also creates
inflexibility that hinders effective response to the diverse nature of the
contemporary problems that beset Japan.a°3
B. Will Japanese Law and Culture Become Further
"Americanized"?
Will Japan develop a more combative, adversarial culture with
this increase in the size and responsiveness of the legal system,
especially with the increase in the number of bengoshi? Throughout the
postwar era, Japanese political and business leaders have seen the
American legal style as a threat to the "traditional" Japanese way of
regulating business, such as through bureaucratic administrative
guidance.204 Thus, with an increase in the number of lawyers and use of
the courts to resolve disputes, Japan may indeed begin to evince more
"adversarial legalism., 20 5 Also, the reforms outlined above, such as the
Administrative Procedures Law and the revision of the Civil Procedure
Code, will likely make Japanese law, and perhaps Japanese society,
somewhat more adversarial in nature.20 6
However, it is important to remember that these reforms were
instituted by representative politicians precisely in order to provide
Japanese citizens, and especially Japanese businesses, with the many
perceived benefits of American legal culture that have been unavailable
203 Dan Rosen, Schooling Lawyers, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 17, 67 (2001).
204 See discussion supra Part III.B.2; see also Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 23,
at 295 ("Political leaders saw American legal style, and American lawyers, as an
explicit threat to the Japanese approach to regulation. Japanese industry feared
the emergence of American style litigation, legal expenses and damage
awards.").
205 This term is attributed to Professor Robert Kagan, who uses it in describing
American legal style as being characterized by "more frequent recourse to
formal legal methods of implementing policy and resolving disputes; more
adversarial and expensive forms of legal contestation; more punitive legal
sanctions (including larger civil damage awards); [and] more frequent judicial
review." Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad, Adversarial Legalism: An
International Perspective, in COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGES?: SOCIAL
REGULATIONS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 146, 150 (Pietro S. Nivola ed.,
1997). David Johnson defines the term as "litigant activism and the threat or
reality of formal legal contestation." Johnson, supra note 88, at 783.
206 Johnson, supra note 88, at 782.
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under previous Japanese systems, both in resolving disputes and in
conducting business.20 7  Moreover, the question may not be one of
imitating "American" legal style at all, but rather one of finding an
appropriate response to the modem global complexities of economic
liberalization and competition, 208 as well as the specific Japanese
problems of political fragmentation 09 and bureaucratic scandal.21°
C. A Cultural Shift in How the Japanese See and Use the
Law?
The current reform of legal education in Japan may reflect an
underlying cultural shift toward increased litigiousness, or at least a
fascination with a life in the law. There are some signs of this in the
popular culture: reality television shows featuring lawsuits have become
popular, 211 advertisements for law firms are popping up in commuter
trains,212 and a television drama about new law school graduates proved a
popular success last year.213
But Japanese interest in legal matters and the law may actually
run deeper than it does in the American population. When surveyed,
over 30% of Japanese responded that they owned a basic legal text, such
as the Roppo Zensho.214 America graduates about 38,000 students from
207 "[T]he benefits of the American way of law look especially attractive to
persons who do not enjoy them." Id.
08 Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 23, at 271.
209 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
210 See discussion supra Part II.C.
211 Mayumi Saito, Law Firms Going Global in Japan, JAPAN INC., Jan. 2003,
available at http://www.japaninc.net/article.php?articlelD=996 (last visited
April 5, 2005).21F Id.
213 Law Trainees Battle Injustice, Professors, YOMIURI SHINBUN, Oct. 9, 2003
(on file with the University of Miami International & Comparative Law
Review). On this television program ("Beginner"), the sometimes-complicated
legal arguments between law students and professors featured explanatory text
on the bottom of the screen. In the supposedly much more law-centric United
States, programs such as "Law and Order," while popular, do not go so far as to
vrovide on-screen legal analysis for viewers.
4 Michael K. Young et al., Japanese Attitudes Towards Contracts: An
Empirical Wrinkle in the Debate, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L. REV. 789, 805
(2003). The Roppo Zensho is a collection of the six main codes of Japanese law
(constitutional; commercial; civil and criminal codes; civil and criminal
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its law schools every year,215 while Japan, with half the population,
graduates over 40,000 college students with degrees in law.216 Although
Japanese undergraduate law students may spend comparatively little time
learning the practical skills of the legal profession, such as how to
question a witness or draft a brief, they unquestionably learn the
substantive rules of law in a broad range of areas, just as well as or even
better than American law students. 217 Furthermore, many of these
40,000 graduates go on to work in corporate Japan,21 8 which has long
recognized the importance of having employees who are knowledgeable
about the law, even as actual bengoshi, because of the strict quotas on
bar admissions, are too scarce to hire in great numbers. Japanese interest
procedure.) One would be hard pressed to imagine a similar percentage of
American homes containing comparable legal text.
215 American Bar Association, Legal Education and Bar Admission Statistics,
available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/lebastats.html (last visited
August 5, 2004).
216 Kawabata, supra note 3, at 431.
217 Make no mistake about it, . . . these graduates undertake an
intense, detailed study of the law and, at least at the time of
graduation, are as conversant as American law school
graduates with the dictates of the law in a broad variety of
settings. Indeed, given that American law schools tend to
train students more in methods of analysis and research and
Japanese law schools more in the substantive content of legal
rules, we would venture that Japanese students can, upon
graduation, recite the applicable law with much more
confidence and accuracy than their American counterparts.
Young et al., supra note 215, at 806.
218 See ODA, supra note 4, at 101; see also Joseph Grimes, Seriously, Japan
Needs More American Lawyers, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 1991 (on file with
the University of Miami International & Comparative Law Review):
What happened to the huge number of Japanese law school
graduates who didn't become bengoshi? They are sitting on
the other side of the negotiating table, working for the
powerful Japanese bureaucracy and for Japanese companies.
And while a few of these law graduates have gone to work for
Japanese subsidiaries of American companies, the majority
still prefer to cast their lot with Japanese companies.
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in law has deep historical roots,219 thus the relative lack of litigiousness
over the past eighty years may be no more than a historical anomaly,
brought on by the political and institutional restrictions outlined above.
220
D. Opposition from the Nichibenren (Japan Federation of
Bar Associations)
The lawyer-members of the Nichibenren are understandably
protective of their profession, having maintained for years that changes
in the legal education system will compromise the quality of the
Japanese legal system as a whole.22' It is the Japanese Bar that has
maintained the strict limits on the number of applicants who are allowed
to pass the national bar exam each year.222
But the strength of the Japanese Bar appears to be waning. In
the 1990s, in the face of opposition from Keidanren, the LDP, and the
Ministry of Justice, the Nichibenren proved unable to prevent increases
in the bar passage rate223 as well as a decrease in the length of the LRTI
219 Japan has had lawyers of one sort or another for over 1,300 years. See ODA,
supra note 4, at 13. The first true legal system in Japan was a modification of a
Chinese import: the ritsuryou. Id. These penal and administrative codes were
brought to Japan by Soga clan envoys returning from studying the Buddhist and
political institutions of T'ang China in the seventh century. Id.. These foreign
laws naturally required interpretation and modification, which was the province
of members of the emperor's daijoukan, or administrative council. See JOHN
WHITNEY HALL, JAPAN: FROM PREHISTORY TO MODERN TIMES 51 (1970).
220 See generally UPHAM, supra note 35 and note 63.
221 This concern has been directed toward foreign lawyers as well:
Japanese lawyers, often acting under the aegis of the Japanese
Federation of Bar Associations (Nichibenren), wished to
restrict competition by limiting the number of lawyers party to
their domestic monopoly and keeping foreign lawyers out of
their captive market. Except during the Occupation, and with
the minor exception of a tiny class of foreign lawyers
grandfathered at that time, foreign lawyers were entirely
excluded from the Japanese legal services market until 1986.
Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 23, at 295-96.
222 Miyazawa, supra note 175, at 90.
223 [T]he Justice Ministry convened the Three-Party Committee
on the Legal Profession (H6s6 Sansha Ky6gikai) in 1988,
which consisted of representatives from the Justice Ministry,
the Supreme Court, and the JFBA. The Justice Ministry
managed to obtain an agreement in the twenty-second session
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apprenticeship training period. 224 Similarly, Japanese law firms,
recognizing that both domestic and foreign corporations prefer to hire
larger firms with multiple specialty departments, have continued to grow
and merge, despite some Nichibenren opposition. 225 The Nichibenren
also continues its vocal opposition to loosening the strictures on foreign
lawyers who wish to work in Japan, despite the clear intent of foreign
lawyers merely to facilitate the work of Japanese lawyers and businesses,
rather than taking work away from Japanese lawyers by practicing
"Japanese law." 226 The biggest blow of all might have come with the
formation of the Justice System Reform Council in 1999, which allowed
a great many other voices, aside from those of Nichibenren members, to
speak out on the direction of Japanese legal education in the twenty-first
of the Committee in 1990, and the National Bar Examination
Act was amended in 1991. The number of those passing the
examination increased from approximately 500 to roughly 600
in 1991, and to 700 in 1993.
Id. at91.
224 In 1999, the length of the practical training period at the LRTI was reduced
from two years to one and a half years. Id. at 94.
225 Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu is credited with beginning
the recent wave of megafirm mergers on January 1, 2000, by
merging the large firm of Nagashima & Ohno with
Tsunematsu, Yanase & Sekine, thereby creating a joint firm
with around 150 lawyers dealing with a wide variety of
domestic and international legal issues. More recently, the
December 1, 2002, merger of one of Japan's 'big four' firms,
Mori Sogo, with Hamada & Matsumoto has created Mori
Hamada & Matsumoto, a firm of 160 attorneys that is already
being regarded as one of the top capital markets firms in
Tokyo as well as a pioneer in rapidly developing technology
fields such as telecommunications and information services.
Other Japanese firms are rapidly gaining on the former 'big
four' Japanese firms as 'aggressive expansion' becomes
crucial in Japan's tight market.
Suzuki, supra note 27, at 395-96.
226 See Japanese Lawyers Scramble to Protect Walled Garden, supra note 26.
And as previously noted, Nichibenren opposition to expanding the scope of a
foreign lawyer's potential practice in Japan is perhaps being diluted with the
recent decision to allow foreign law firms with offices in Japan to hire Japanese
lawyers. See supra note 198.
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century.
227
E. Are These Reforms Too Timid?
The intense focus on the creation of new law schools may be too
conservative an approach, one that misses an opportunity to meet the
lofty and admirable goals expressed by the Justice System Reform
Council.228 Perhaps the new law schools are just an expensive, showy
distraction, and more effective lawyers could be trained by simply
revamping the undergraduate legal education programs that are already
in place. 229 Double undergraduate degrees, like those offered in
Australia and New Zealand, could ensure the needed diversity of
intellectual backgrounds that appear to be lacking in the successful cram-
school applicants of today. 230 Adding years to the legal education
process will dramatically increase the cost for students who want to
become lawyers, but adding years to the process is no guarantee that
graduates will be more mature or perspicacious. 23' And not only the
227 See discussion supra Part V.C. 1.
228 See, e.g., Professor Sato's comments, supra note 186.
229 Nottage, supra note 1, at 35.
230 Those graduating with double degrees gain an edge over those
majoring only in law, amidst increasing competition to be
hired by a good law firm. They are also better equipped to
move into neighboring areas of work, such as accountancy or
business consultancy, more like legal information engineering.
Ultimately, should they want to become the judges of the
future, they may retain a distinct advantage over those who
have studied only law. At the least, the New Zealand and
Australian experience shows that it is not necessary for law
faculties to train students for five or six years, just to become
an effective practicing lawyer.
Id. at 43.
231 Even if it can be shown systematically that Japanese law
students, even the highly motivated and intelligent ones that
currently pass the bar examination, lack basic maturity, it need
not follow that they should spend more time at law school. If
the real problem is unawareness of contemporary society or
business practices among that [sic) those who go on to a career
as a judge, for instance, then a better solution may be to
improve the systems for selecting judges (e.g., hoso ichigen)




Japanese Bar, but some business leaders also are doubtful that creating so
many new law schools in such a short time will produce Japanese legal
professionals of high caliber.232
Conclusion
The sudden appearance of sixty-eight new law schools in one
month in 2004 looks radical from the outside, but it can be understood in
the context of decades of debate, years of economic stagnation,
increasing bureaucratic scandal, the spurs of global competition,
administrative reforms that ease litigation, and the demands of the
Japanese corporate community. Rather than simply reflecting a new-
found litigiousness induced by exposure to American legal ways, the
new law schools represent one among many institutional reforms that are
poised to allow Japan to respond to contemporary economic and social
problems in a new way, one that may finally pull Japan out of the
economic doldrums of the past decade.233
232 Id. at 49-50.
233 "The new law schools may be more likely to succeed if they adopt this
broader view of practical education [that includes a greater emphasis on
business law subjects] and broaden it still further to include an emphasis on
training in the legal method." Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 2, at 317.
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